Abstract
The difficulty of verifying and validating (V&V) autonomy is usually an essential part of such systems. However, software has limited its use on spacecraft. In this paper, we adaptation of autonomy software is limited by its overview new approaches to autonomy V&V and describe complexity and the difficulty of verifying and validating it.
an experiment with one of the approaches. Our experiment
We describe an approach named runtime verification for involved regression testing for PLASMA, the next testing autonomy software. Runtime verification is a generation of planning technology used to create MAPGEN technique for generating test oracles from abstract [4] , which in turn was used to plan and schedule MER specifications of expected behavior. We describe its Rover activities. Planners take as input a set of high level application to the PLASMA planning system, used in the goals to be achieved, such as driving a Rover to a distant recent Mars Exploration Rover missions. We furthermore location, or taking a picture or measurement, and generate a discuss alternative autonomy V&V approaches.
series of low-level commands that realize the goals, while respecting the flight resource and safety constraints such as When constructing a planner in this way, the key activities that uses EUROPA [9] , a precursor of PLASMA. Upwards are building the model and ensuring that the heuristic search of 700 activities each day are planned by MAPGEN. used by the planner is effective in finding good plans for the goal sets of interest. A common development methodology
The EO-1 Autonomous Science Agent [5] hybrid approach. and an "engine" that interprets problem solving tasks using this model. This different structure calls into question the In the rigorous approach of formal methods, preciselydirect applicability of traditional white box structural testing specified software properties are stated and mathematically methods and coverage criteria. The model-based approach verified. The precision is obtained by stating properties in a furthermore leads to a development methodology in which formal logic. A particularly relevant one for expressing the model is incrementally developed and validated, which properties of software is temporal logic. Temporal logic is a in turn requires a V&V methodology that can support such logic that enables succinct description of systems that frequent modifications. Empirical observation suggests that evolve over time, for example, the discrete computational it is more difficult for a human to understand the behavior steps of a computer program. Temporal logic is appropriate of model-based systems because of the seemingly for programs that are reactive, i.e. those that execute exponential number of possible interactions of model continuously by reacting to an environment, and do not elements. Because the engine is fairly stable (except for simply take an input at the start of the computation and changes to heuristics) and shared between different produce a single output at termination. Using temporal logic applications, validating the model is the primary V&V properties like "if the reset signal is received then within 1 focus.
second the device is reset" are naturally stated. Furthermore, V&V can be more effective if not just the inputs and Finally, almost by definition, autonomy software is required outputs of a program are examined but also the internals of to react to a diverse set of conditions. A test approach based the computation. There again temporal logic is relevant. on testing a nominal scenario and off-nominal variants cannot be applied. A larger operational profile must be Runtime verification applies temporal logic to program defined and tested against. Thus one can expect that for
testing. The software is tested for conformance to precisely autonomy software the test set is very large, and that stated properties specified in the logic. The properties may automated testing procedures will be very important.
be universal properties that are expected true of all program inputs, as with traditional formal verification, or can be In summary, autonomy is a high-stakes technology often properties specific to a particular input. Runtime used at the highest level of commanding systems with high verification acknowledges that proving non-trivial cost and human risk. The V&V task is more difficult for functional and performance properties for all inputs for autonomy software because it complex software is beyond current capabilities, but that the specification of those properties using a formal language * has an input-output behavior that is difficult to * has a declarative model-based architecture that
The oracle is a predicate that determines if the behavior of makes it difficult to predict "execution paths". the program is the desired or correct behavior with respect to the input. In an automated test suite the oracle must be In the following we shall investigate a particular V&V represented by code that performs the checking. If the technology, runtime verification, which can be used to correct behavior of the program is described by a set of increase the reliability of model-based autonomy systems.
temporal logic formulas then the oracle is a program for checking those formulas. The value added by runtime 3 RUNTIME VERIFICATION verification is the creation of tools to automatically generate 3 RUNTIME VERIFICATION such oracles. The key technology is a compiler or Runtime Verification interpreter that translates temporal logic formulas into code that checks if a program execution conforms to the property. Formal methods hold out the promise for higher-quality software verification by judicious application of A runtime verification system can be architected so that the mathematical methods. Unfortunately formal methods have checking is done independently of the system under test. In not scaled to be routinely applied to production software this case the system under test is instrumented so that a code. The challenges of autonomy software, described sequential log is generated. The log can be saved to a file above, exacerbate this problem making it unlikely that for offline analysis or examined in real time. Alternatively the checking can be done as code that is integrated into the system under test. There are advantages to both approaches.
In the first state both x and y are 0. In the next state x is 1 The main advantage of the independent approach is that the while y is still 0, etc. Our logic allows us to state properties impact on the real time performance of the system under test about such a trace, properties that can be checked. Assume is minimized to creation of the log. The main advantage of for example that we want to state and check the (true) the integrated approach is that the checking can become part property "P1. it is always the case that when x is positive of the system under test thus supporting an autonomic then eventually y becomes positive". This sentence embeds computing or Integrated Vehicle Health Management two temporal operators "always" and "eventually", which (IVHM) capability.
we will have to define. Note, once defined they can be reused. The definition in Eagle of these two operators is as Figure 2 illustrates the offline architecture we used in this follows: runtime verification application.
max Always (Form F) = F A @ Always (F)
The first definition introduces the temporal operator want to state and check the (false) property: "P2. whenever engineering mission applications with PLASMA. In this x is positive with some value k, then sometime in the past y section we briefly present the underlying semantics of plans had that value, and sometime in the future x is less than k". and planning in PLASMA, and describe the components of This property can be stated as follows, using an extra rule R a typical application using PLASMA. to capture the value k:
Plans and Planning in PLASMA min R (int k) = Prey (y=k) A Even (x<k) Consider the problem of controlling an imaging system on a satellite. In this example, we are concerned with attitude mon M2 = Always (x>O -> R (x)) adjustment to position a camera, and control of the camera to take pictures. One could imagine a planning system The rule R is here introduced to capture the value of x at which received input of initial attitude (i.e. initial state) and the moment where x>O, binding it to the formal parameter a set of imaging requests (i.e. goals). The solution is a k.
sequence of states and actions reflecting the camera and satellite attitude control over time to accomplish the given Eagle rules are converted into oracles that check the trace, requests (i.e. a plan). For simplicity, an imaging request is state by state, without storing the entire trace. This means given by a position, and attitude is controlled to point to a that very large traces can be examined on-the-fly while the position. Imaging requests are serviced by a Camera, and system under test is executing. This works by for each attitude control is accomplished by an Attitude Controller. monitor to maintain a "current formula" that represents the These are two objects of the system whose behavior varies value of the original formula on the so-far processed prefix over time. The notion of predicates applying over intervals of the trace. Consider for example the monitor for P1 above.
of time is fundamental to the description of object behavior
After having processed the first state (x=O,y=O), the current in the PLASMA planning paradigm. The interval of time formula is unchanged since no triggering positive x was over which a predicate occurs is described using temporal detected. After processing the second state (x=1,y=0) variables i.e. start, end and duration. Use of variables however, the formula now changes to:
provides board and on-board planning and plan execution appicaion arsn ithdoanfspcexlrin. In Constraints must be specified in the model. For example addition to support of the development activities of there IS the obvious constraint that a camera cannot be off PLSM itef it is an imotn goa to prvd while it iS taking a picture. A number of additional model cmreesv veiicto an vaiato suprfo*.r rules are indicated in Figure 3a . For example, the camera must be ready before it is used to take a picture. Such a rule is naturally enforced as a constraint equating the end time of In essence, the focus of the work presented in this paper is log containing the pertinent data for testing the asserted model1-based planning systems, and specifically how runtime verification can be used to observe the process of a planner interpreting a model, with the purpose of analyzing injected faults, a simulator of the modeled device and the the quality of the model. There has been relatively little Livingstone Engine. The system checks whether the work on V&V of autonomy software, and nothing to our diagnosis system can detect the faults injected into the input knowledge on such regression testing for autonomy model stream. validation.
A model can alternatively be analyzed in isolation, without 8 CONCLUSIONS invoking a planner, for various properties, such as completeness and soundness. In [13] and [11] [12] is a system for testing Livingstone models. Livingstone is a model-based diagnosis system. LPF consists of a test driver that generates a sequence consisting of either commands or 8
